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 November 2003 marked a new 
chapter in Georgian history. 
Through non-violent public 
protests triggered by highly fraudulent 
parliamentary elections on 2 November 
2003, the government of Georgia, 
headed by Eduard Shevardnadze, was 
ousted and interim rule, under the 
leadership of the Western-educated 
international lawyer and charismatic 
opposition leader, Mikhail Saakashvili, 
came to power. Later, through widely 
recognized democratic elections, 
Saakasvhili was elected President and 
a new composition of the Georgian 
Parliament was formed. Immediately 
upon election, the establishment of 
Western-style democracy based on the 
rule of law was proclaimed as an ultimate 
goal of Georgia’s new leadership. 
Protection of fundamental human rights 
and freedoms, along with re-establishing 
order and equality before the law, 
especially regarding the accountability 
and responsibility of public officials, 
was said to be one of the top priorities 
in the government’s reform agenda. Yet, 
unfortunately, since its inception, the 
government has not been immune from 
criticism from human rights groups and 
the opposition concerning the conduct 
of the police forces, notably in relation 
to arrests or ‘special’ operations when so called 
‘special squads’ have participated 
in arrests in important cases. 
Allegations of frequent abuse of 
power by arrest squads and the lack 
of any subsequent investigations and 
prosecution are supported by official 
statistics supplied by the Office of the 
Prosecutor General. According to the 
data, during 2005-2006, 73 of these 
special operations were conducted and, 
as a result, 25 persons died. However, 
investigations into the fact of injury 
or death during arrest operations were 
opened in only four cases. It is significant 
that almost one-third of special operations 
have resulted in the death of the suspect 
and official inquiries into the incidents 
have taken place only in about two per 
cent of all cases. 
Detailed information regarding 
specific instances of the use of lethal force 
by the police during arrest operations, 
which resulted in the death of suspects 
and inadequate follow up from the 
Prosecutor’s Office, also gives a good 
indication of the tendency of ‘loose’ 
attitudes among law enforcement officials 
concerning the use of lethal force. In one 
of these cases, on 11 November 2005, 
the police killed an unarmed suspect, 
Levan Gulua, a young man standing at 
the entrance of a blockhouse building, 
when reacting to a telephone report of a 
planned burglary in one of the capital’s 
neighbourhoods. Unfortunately, this 
incident did not result in an investigation 
by the Prosecutor’s Office, which is 
charged with the task of supervising the 
lawfulness of the activities of the police 
force, or the prosecution of the officials 
involved. 
Th e fact that many arrest operations 
result in the death of suspects, as well as 
the absence of adequate follow up and 
inquiry from the relevant authorities, 
has led to a debate on the reasons and 
causes for such a tendency. Th ere are 
two principal lines of argument on this 
subject. Human rights activists have 
suggested that a laissez faire attitude 
towards the use of lethal force, resulting 
in a large number of casualties during 
arrest operations, is a part of the 
Government’s policy of cracking down 
on organized crime, which is intended 
to signal to criminal gangs the readiness 
of the police to ‘respond’ with the use 
of fi rearms to instances of crime and 
instill panic and fear among criminals. 
However, other experts have argued that 
the reason is the lack of training and 
competence among police officers, as 
well as the inheritance from the Soviet 
period of a lack of consideration of 
human rights standards. 
Actually, both arguments have a 
point and deserve further discussion. 
Statements by the President of Georgia 
and the Minister of Interior have raised 
questions about the possibility of the 
existence of a government policy which 
deliberately fuels a feeling of superiority 
amongst law enforcement officers, in 
order to strengthen the fight against 
crime. In both statements, policemen 
were encouraged to “eliminate criminals 
on the spot” if they endanger the lives 
of citizens and policemen. As statements 
from such a high level are usually 
perceived as pronouncements of state 
policy, both statements made under 
the aegis of enhancing the fi ght against 
organized crime could be understood to 
establish a state level policy of allowing 
the unlimited use of force by the police 
to combat crime. Moreover, gradually 
a new term has been established in the 
law enforcement discourse - ‘elimination 
of criminals’ - which has been reiterated 
by high-level officials after almost every 
arrest operation resulting in the death of 
the suspect. Furthermore, media reports 
from law enforcement agencies, as well as 
high-level officials commenting on arrest 
operations, have almost always gravely 
violated the presumption of innocence 
of the person killed. Although in the 
majority of cases persons had not yet 
been charged with the commission of a 
crime, they were labelled as ‘criminals’, 
‘gangsters’, ‘recidivists’ and ‘members of 
the mafi a’. Proponents alleging that the 
high rate of mortality in arrest operations 
is due to an intentional policy of law 
enforcement argue that the attempts 
of senior offi cials to establish such a 
discourse have been part of a media 
strategy attempting to justify such a 
policy. Finally, the extremely low rate 
of effective investigations, the lack of 
a single case where police officials have 
been held accountable for the excessive 
use of force resulting in a casualty or of 
an instance of public accountability for 
such incidents by their superiors or the 
political leadership further corroborate 
speculation about the existence of a 
policy designed to establish fear of the 
police. 
On the other hand, suggestion of 
police incompetence and the lack 
of adequate skill and training of law 
enforcement officials are also quite 
well founded. Although the Ministry 
of Interior has undergone reforms 
and there has been a major change in 
the staffing of the police, new recruits 
spend only a few weeks in preparatory 
training and minimal attention is paid 
to the discussion of basic human rights 
standards concerning the right to life 
and other related standards in their 
training curricula. In addition, the lack 
of adequate planning and preparation 
for police operations, which is often 
explained by the lack of experience and 
expertise of the responsible officials, 
many of whom were appointed after 
the change of government, may explain 
the high rate of mortality of suspects. 
Moreover, skills-based training in the 
use of lethal force has only recently been 
incorporated into the training of new 
police recruits. Representatives of the 
Prosecutors’ Office often argue that a 
lack of competence in the investigation 
of complex cases among its employees, 
when particular expertise is required to 
determine whether lethal force was used 
in circumstances of absolute necessity 
or in violation of the principle of 
proportionality, explains an extremely low 
percentage of subsequent inquiries and 
prosecutions. Additionally, it is inevitable 
that the Soviet-style law enforcement 
mentality is deeply rooted in the public 
service culture of law enforcement, 
where minimal consideration is given 
to human rights standards, which are 
overwhelmed by the need to preserve the 
‘dignity of the office’ and hence, there is 
a reluctance to reveal the misconduct 
of colleagues or subordinates. Besides, 
the heritage of Soviet law enforcement 
culture still influences the institutional 
kinship between the police and the 
Prokuratura (Prosecutor’s Office), 
which results in a lack of adequate 
investigations and prosecution of 
violations by police officers by the latter. 
Unfortunately, attempted reforms by 
the current government in the last few 
years (as Shevardnadze’s Government 
rather reinforced this culture) have not 
been enough to establish a new public 
service and human rights-oriented 
culture amongst the large corps of law 
enforcement personnel. 
Th erefore, proponents of both 
approaches have their own reasonable 
arguments. Groups that allege deliberate 
attempts by the political leadership 
to establish an image of immense law 
enforcement power, base their analysis 
on external assessments, including 
the actions of the political leadership 
and high-level state offi cials, as well as 
offi cial data. Advocates of the latter 
approach related to lack of competence 
and reform in the system mainly use 
subjective, internal factors for arguing 
their position. Th e formulation and 
subsequent implementation of an active 
reform strategy, taking into account 
assessments and recommendations 
framed in the continuous public 
debate on the subject, stands as the 
best possible response to the trend 
of an excessive rate of killings during 
arrests, where none of the parties can 
possibly win. 
